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The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act represents
the crossroads of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment, informed
consent, and abortion-related jurisprudence. The Act requires physi-
cians to perform an obstetric ultrasound, verbally convey specific in-
formation regarding ultrasonographic findings, and communicate a
host of other information to patients seeking abortions. The pur-
ported goal of the Act is to ensure that physicians obtain appropriate
informed consent from such patients. By compelling a physician to
convey this information, the State violates the physician’s First
Amendment rights. Indeed, the State may not compel an individual
to convey the State’s ideological message. Further, any statute that
mandates that an individual speak alters the content of that speech
and is, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny. Pursuant to current
United States Supreme Court precedents on compelled and content-
based speech, the relevant portions of the Act are unconstitutional.
Further, the claim made by the Act’s proponents that the speech in-
volved is commercial speech, subject to a lesser degree of First
Amendment scrutiny, fails under the Court’s commercial speech
precedents. The State may reasonably regulate the medical profession
by mandating that physicians obtain informed consent and convey
limited, truthful information to patients. However, the Act’s exten-
sive and one-size-fits-all approach to informed consent is not a rea-
sonable regulation of medical practice. What is left, therefore, is an
unconstitutional attempt by the State to infringe on the First
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Amendment rights of physicians providing abortions in North
Carolina.
INTRODUCTION • 188
I. THE WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW ACT: NORTH
CAROLINA AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS • 190
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT • 194
A. The First Amendment Prohibits Government-
Compelled Speech • 195
B. Content-Based Speech Regulations Are Subject
to Strict Scrutiny • 198
C. The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know
Act Does Not Involve Commercial
Speech • 203
III. THE WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW ACT: AT THE
CROSSROADS OF FIRST AMENDMENT, INFORMED
CONSENT, AND ABORTION
JURISPRUDENCE • 206
A. Where We Have Been: A Brief History of
Abortion-Related Jurisprudence • 207
B. Where We Are Now: The Federal
Circuits • 211
C. Where We Are Going: The Supreme Court’s
Opportunity to Vindicate a Physician’s Right
to Free Speech • 214
CONCLUSION • 222
INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act (“the Act”) seeks to
ensure that physicians and associated qualified professionals1 obtain appro-
priate informed consent from patients who seek to undergo abortions.2 By
requiring that physicians perform an obstetric ultrasound and verbally con-
vey specific information regarding ultrasonographic findings—collectively
known as the “speech and display requirement”—as well as communicate a
host of other information to patients,3 the Act greatly expands traditional
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). While the
Act specifically permits either “the physician who is to perform the abortion[ ] or a
qualified technician working in conjunction with the physician” to perform the ul-
trasound, id., this Article will refer to these parties collectively as “physician.”
2. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 405.
3. §§ 90-21.82, 90-21.85 (Westlaw).
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notions of informed consent. These requirements also raise constitutional
concerns for both physicians and their patients.
This Article discusses whether compelling a physician to verbally con-
vey information that he4 would not otherwise communicate5 to patients
seeking abortions in order to further the State’s admitted interest in discour-
aging abortion6 violates the physician’s First Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution. Two general and inter-related First Amendment
principles are relevant to this discussion. First, a state may not compel an
individual to speak on its behalf.7 Second, when a state does mandate that
an individual speak, it necessarily alters the content of that speech.8 Courts
apply strict scrutiny to such content-based speech regulations.9 The speech
and display requirement both compels physicians to speak and fails to sat-
isfy strict scrutiny analysis. Additionally, the speech that the Act compels is
inconsistent with commercial speech; however, even if commercial speech
jurisprudence was to control, the Act fails under standard commercial
speech analysis. Solely from a First Amendment perspective, therefore, these
portions of the North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act are
unconstitutional.
Such a conclusion would be inadequate without addressing additional
Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns. Indeed, the Act represents
the crossroads of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment, informed consent,
and abortion-related jurisprudence. Generally, the Supreme Court has held
that states may act to ensure that women undergoing abortions give in-
formed consent.10 Fundamental flaws in the language of the Act itself, how-
ever, result in an informed consent statute that fails to achieve informed
consent for certain patients. Further, the Court has averred the right of a
state, under its police power, to reasonably regulate the medical profession.11
However, a one-size-fits-all approach to informed consent, especially when
it requires that all physicians verbally convey a predetermined script, is sim-
ply not a reasonable regulation of medical practice. The Supreme Court’s
reproductive autonomy jurisprudence, therefore, does not control. Conse-
4. For the sake of clarity and to avoid confusion, throughout this Article, the generic
physician will be referred to as “he” or “him,” while the patients seeking abortions
will be referred to as “she” or “her.”
5. See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 n.4, 432 n.7 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
6. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 428, 429 n.4, 432.
7. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
8. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
9. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 961
(4th ed. 2011).
10. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
11. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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quently, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence remains dis-
positive. Overall, the speech and display requirement, which compels a
physician to perform an obstetric ultrasound and to communicate to pa-
tients specific fetal anatomical findings, violates the physician’s First
Amendment rights.
I. THE WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW ACT: NORTH CAROLINA AND
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act is “an act to require
a twenty-four-hour waiting period and the informed consent of a pregnant
woman before an abortion may be performed.”12 The North Carolina
House of Representatives passed the bill on June 8, 2011 with the State
Senate following suit on June 15, 2011.13 Governor Beverly Purdue vetoed
the bill on June 27, 2011.14 The bill became law upon a legislative override
of the Governor’s veto on July 28, 2011.15 A group of physicians and physi-
cian organizations, on behalf of themselves and their patients seeking abor-
tions, filed suit on September 29, 2011 seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief and challenging the constitutionality of the Act.16 On October 25,
2011, one day prior to the statute’s effective date,17 Judge Catherine Eagles
of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Caro-
lina granted, in part, plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.18
At oral argument regarding the preliminary injunction, the State19
contended that the Act will “protect[ ] abortion patients from psychological
and emotional distress . . . ”; “prevent[ ] women from being coerced into
having abortions . . . ”; and “promot[e] life and discourage abortion.”20 In
order to achieve these purposes, the Act purports to ensure that a physician
obtains from his patients appropriate informed consent prior to performing
12. Woman’s Right to Know Act, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 405.





16. See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 426 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
17. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
18. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (order granting preliminary injunction).
19. Defendants in this action include the President of the North Carolina Medical
Board, the North Carolina Attorney General, the Secretary of the North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services, and eight North Carolina district attor-
neys. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1, Stuart, 834 F. Supp.
2d 424 (No. 11CV00804), 2011 WL 4494253, at 1. For this Article, I will refer to
these defendants collectively as “the State.”
20. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
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the procedure.21 To that end, the Act requires that physicians perform an
obstetric ultrasound, orally describe specific fetal anatomical findings to the
patient, and provide patients with information regarding the physician’s
malpractice insurance and hospital admitting privileges.22 The bill also di-
rects North Carolina to create a website and disseminate information re-
garding, inter alia, fetal development and organizations that provide
information regarding alternatives to abortion.23 Lastly, it creates a civil
cause of action by both patients undergoing abortion and “any father of an
unborn child that was the subject of an abortion” against physicians who do
not comply with the statute.24
With respect to the speech and display requirement, the Act provides,
inter alia, that:
[A]t least four hours before a woman having any part of an abor-
tion performed or induced, and before the administration of any
anesthesia or medication in preparation for the abortion on the
woman, the physician who is to perform the abortion, or quali-
fied technician working in conjunction with the physician, shall
do each of the following:
(1) Perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn child on
the pregnant woman.
(2) Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display is
depicting, which shall include the presence, location, and
dimensions of the unborn child within the uterus and the num-
ber of unborn children depicted. The individual performing the
display shall offer the pregnant woman the opportunity to hear
the fetal heart tone. . . .
(3) Display the images so that the pregnant woman may view
them.
(4) Provide a medical description of the images, which shall in-
clude the dimensions of the embryo or fetus and the presence of
external members and internal organs, if present and viewable.25
The Act further states that:
[C]onsent to an abortion is voluntary and informed only if all of
the following conditions are satisfied:
21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
22. Id. at § 90-21.82, 90-21.85.
23. Id. at § 90-21.83.
24. Id. at § 90-21.88.
25. Id. at § 90-21.85.
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(1) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, a physician or quali-
fied professional has orally informed the woman, by telephone
or in person, of all of the following:
a. The name of the physician who will perform the
abortion.
b. The particular medical risks associated with the particu-
lar abortion procedure to be employed, including, when
medically accurate, the risks of infection, hemorrhage, cer-
vical tear or uterine perforation, danger to subsequent
pregnancies, including the ability to carry a child to full
term, and any adverse psychological effects associated with
the abortion.
c. The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the
same time the abortion is to be performed.
d. The medical risks associated with carrying the child to
term.
e. The display of a real-time view of the unborn child and
heart tone monitoring that enable the pregnant woman to
view her unborn child or listen to the heartbeat of the un-
born child are available to the woman. . . .
f. If the physician who is to perform the abortion has no
liability insurance for malpractice in the perform-
ance . . . of an abortion, that information shall be
communicated.
g. The location of the hospital that offers obstetrical or
gynecological care located within 30 miles of the location
where the abortion is performed . . . and at which the phy-
sician performing . . . the abortion has clinical privileges. If
the physician . . . has no local hospital admitting privileges,
that information shall be communicated.
(2) The physician or qualified professional has informed the
woman, either by telephone or in person, of each of the follow-
ing at least 24 hours before the abortion:
a. That medical assistance benefits may be available for
prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care.
b. That public assistance programs under Chapter 108A of
the General Statutes may or may not be available as bene-
fits under Federal and State assistance programs.
c. That the father is liable to assist in the support of the
child, even if the father has offered to pay for the abortion.
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d. That the woman has other alternatives to abortion, in-
cluding keeping the baby or placing the baby up for
adoption.
e. . . . . The physician or a qualified professional shall
orally inform the woman that the materials [described in
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.83 (Westlaw through
2013 Reg. Sess.)] have been provided by the Department
and that they describe the unborn child and list agencies
that offer alternatives to abortion. If the woman chooses to
view the materials other than on the Web site, the materi-
als shall either be given to her at least 24 hours before the
abortion or be mailed to her . . . .26
In overriding the Governor’s veto, the General Assembly added North
Carolina to an expanding list of jurisdictions that have sought to regulate
abortion by requiring the performance of an obstetrical ultrasound as a fun-
damental facet of abortion-related informed consent.27 After the Supreme
Court’s decisions in both Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey28 and Gonzales v. Carhart,29 states have focused on informed consent
as a means of regulating abortion.30 States have increasingly concluded that
ultrasound is a component of abortion-related informed consent; in fact,
twenty-two states have enacted some type of legislation requiring that physi-
cians either perform or offer to perform obstetric ultrasounds on patients
seeking abortions, and more are considering similar legislation.31 Four
states, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas, have enacted stat-
utes that require physicians to both perform ultrasounds and verbally con-
vey detailed and specific ultrasonographic findings to their patients prior to
performing an abortion. These statutes provide different exceptions in lim-
ited circumstances such as rape, incest, medical emergency, or the presence
of specific fetal medical conditions.32
26. Id. at § 90-21.82.
27. See Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to Know:
Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN L. REV. 595,
647–52 (2012) (providing both a comprehensive listing and tabulations of abortion-
related statutes and proposed bills).
28. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–87 (1992).
29. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007).
30. See § 90-21.82 (Westlaw); see also Rachel B. Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion
Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 8 (2007).
31. See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.
32. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122 (Westlaw through 2013).
North Carolina’s Act requires ultrasounds be performed in all cases of abortion ex-
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Not surprisingly, these statutes have given rise to constitutional chal-
lenges in both state and federal district courts. Trial court judges in North
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas have enjoined the enforcement of the ultra-
sound-related provisions of the respective statutes.33 Appellate courts have
addressed the constitutionality of the Oklahoma and Texas statutes. The
Oklahoma County District Court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court have
twice enjoined and declared void different versions of the Oklahoma
Woman’s Right to Know Act, first on state constitutional grounds and more
recently on federal constitutional grounds.34 In Texas Medical Providers Per-
forming Abortion Services v. Lakey, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals vacated the preliminary injunction that had been preventing the
enforcement of the ultrasound-related provisions of the Texas Woman’s
Right to Know Act.35 Given the divergent opinions among members of the
state and federal judiciary, the constitutionality of requiring physicians to
discuss ultrasonographic findings with patients seeking abortions is a topic
ripe for discussion.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Act violates a physician’s First Amendment rights. By requiring
that he verbally describe, in detail, ultrasonographic findings regarding fetal
anatomy, it compels him to engage in content-based speech as part of the
State’s admitted attempt to “promot[e] life and discourage abortion.”36
Given that the Supreme Court has, on multiple occasions, held that the
State may not compel an individual to convey an ideological message on the
State’s behalf,37 the Act’s speech and display provisions are unconstitutional.
Further, the Act does not pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny,
the standard lens through which the Court views content-based speech re-
cept when there exists a statutorily defined “medical emergency.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 90-21.86 (Westlaw).
33. See Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, No. CV-2010-533 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2012)
(order granting permanent injunction); Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437
(M.D.N.C. 2011) (order granting preliminary injunction); Tex. Med. Providers Per-
forming Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 977–78 (W.D. Tex. 2011);
Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, No. CV-2010-533 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 3, 2010)
(order granting temporary injunction).
34. See Pruitt, No. CV-2010-533 (Okla. Dist. Mar. 28, 2012) (order granting perma-
nent injunction), aff’d, 2012 OK 103, ¶ 3, 292 P.3d 28, 29 (Okla. 2012); Edmond-
son, No. CV-2010-533 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 3, 2010) (order granting temporary
injunction), aff’d, 233 P.3d 380 (Okla. 2010).
35. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th
Cir. 2012).
36. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
37. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–98 (1988).
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strictions.38 The Court, therefore, should invalidate the speech and display
requirement of the Act.
A. The First Amendment Prohibits Government-Compelled Speech
The First Amendment generally prohibits statutes that abridge an in-
dividual’s free speech and protects individuals from being required to en-
gage in government-compelled speech. In relevant part, the First
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”39 The Supreme Court has construed the freedom
of speech clause broadly, holding that “the First Amendment guarantees
freedom of speech, a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what
to say and what not to say.”40 The Court has further stated that “at the
heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free
to believe as he will and that in a free society, one’s beliefs should be shaped
by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.”41 Overall,
“where the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how
acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”42
The government may not compel an individual to convey a state-
sponsored message.43 In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court addressed “whether
[New Hampshire] may constitutionally require an individual to participate
in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private
property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and
read by the public.”44 Maynard, a Jehovah’s Witness, both excised a portion
of his license plate and placed tape on the plate, thereby either removing or
obscuring from view portions of the state motto, “Live Free or Die.”45 After
being found guilty three times for violating a New Hampshire statute mak-
ing it a misdemeanor to knowingly cover figures or letters on an automo-
bile’s license plate, Maynard sought injunctive and declaratory relief from
further enforcement of the law.46 In an affidavit filed in District Court,
38. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (“[A]ny restriction
based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest . . . .”).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796–97; see also W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
633–34 (1943).
41. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977).
42. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
43. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
44. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.
45. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 708 n.4.
46. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707–09.
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Maynard stated, “I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a slogan
which I find morally, ethically, religiously, and politically abhorrent.”47 The
Court determined that such refusal was appropriate; indeed, the Court held
that the First Amendment protected individuals who refuse to convey a
state-sponsored ideological message with which they disagree.48
Further, the government may not compel an organization to convey
factual statements that the organization would otherwise prefer to avoid.49
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, the
Supreme Court addressed “whether Massachusetts may require private citi-
zens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group im-
parting a message the organizers do not wish to convey.”50 Here, the
sponsor of the Boston Saint Patrick’s Day Parade refused to permit a group
of gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals of Irish descent to march in the
parade.51 The defendant group’s members sought to “express pride in their
Irish heritage . . . , to demonstrate that there are such men and women
among those so descended, and to express their solidarity with like individu-
als who sought to march in New York’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade.”52 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s opinion finding
that the defendant group was “entitled to participate in the Parade on the
same terms and conditions as other participants.”53 A unanimous Supreme
Court, however, reversed and stated that Massachusetts “may not compel
affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees. Indeed, this general
rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor [his own] speech[,] applies not
only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to state-
ments of fact the speaker would rather avoid.”54 The Court described the
case as “boil[ing] down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a partic-
ular point of view, [where] that choice is presumed to lie beyond the gov-
ernment’s power to control.”55 Indeed, the State “is not free to interfere
with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may
strike the government.”56
47. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.
48. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715, 717.
49. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995).
50. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
51. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
52. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
53. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 563–64.
54. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573–74, 581 (citations omitted).
55. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
56. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579.
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Just as the defendants in both Wooley and Hurley attempted to require
individuals to adopt, as their own, the messages of others, North Carolina’s
Act “compel[s] unwilling speakers to deliver the State’s message discourag-
ing abortion.”57 Specifically, the Act requires that a physician “[p]rovide a
simultaneous explanation of what the [ultrasound] display is depicting” and
“[p]rovide a medical description of the images, which shall include the
dimensions of the embryo or fetus and the presence of external members
and internal organs, if present and viewable.”58 The provision of this infor-
mation is inextricably linked to conveying the State’s anti-abortion message.
Indeed, in Stuart, the State did not dispute at oral argument that one of the
“purpose[s] of the speech-and-display requirements was to persuade women
not to have abortions by presenting ‘compelling’ visual and personal infor-
mation.”59 Additionally, the State did not contradict the “undisputed evi-
dence establish[ing] that th[is] information is not generally medically
necessary.”60 In fact, “the uncontradicted evidence establishe[d] that there is
no medical purpose for requiring the speaking or showing of this material to
an unwilling listener.”61 Further, the Court wrote that the State did not
provide any evidence to support the claim that the speech and display re-
quirement would protect patients from potential psychological distress, one
of the State’s purported interests in passing this legislation.62 To the con-
trary, the only evidence presented to the Court was that the ultrasound
provision would, in actuality, “harm the psychological health of the very
group the [S]tate purports to protect.”63
From this evidence, coupled with the fact that the State failed to con-
tradict it, one can reasonably conclude that a physician would otherwise not
present this information as part of routine informed consent discussions
with patients. Further, considering the undisputed evidence that the speech
and display requirement may actually harm patients, the plaintiff physicians
in Stuart reasonably preferred exercising their constitutional right under
Wooley and Hurley to act in concert with their own beliefs over becoming a
vehicle conveying the State’s anti-abortion message.64 More broadly, this
message may be in direct conflict with the physician’s ethical obligations to
individual patients. The speech and display portion of the Act places a phy-
sician in the unenviable position of having to choose between Scylla or Cha-
57. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
59. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 429 n.4.
60. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 429 n.4.
61. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432 n.7.
62. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
63. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
64. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 428.
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rybdis:65 violate the statute or violate his oath and the foundational
principles of medicine. However, the First Amendment and the Supreme
Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence protect a physician who provides
abortion services from having to face this ethical dilemma. Indeed, by re-
quiring physicians to express the State’s ideological message, the Act violates
one of the foundational principles of the First Amendment: the State may
not compel an individual to convey an ideological message that is not his
own.
B. Content-Based Speech Regulations Are Subject to Strict Scrutiny
Even if courts decide, for whatever reason, to disregard the Supreme
Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence, the Act, which is a content-based
speech regulation, is not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal and, therefore,
does not survive strict scrutiny. The Court has developed a “two-tier system
of review” of regulations affecting free speech: courts review content-based
regulations under strict scrutiny and employ intermediate scrutiny when
evaluating a content-neutral regulation.66 The Act’s requirement that a phy-
sician verbally describe fetal anatomical findings to patients obligates that
physician to engage in content-based speech.67 This is because “[m]andating
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the con-
tent of the speech.”68 The Supreme Court has also averred that “[a]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to [con-
trol] expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”69 Consistent with this statement, the Court views content-based
speech regulations with substantial skepticism.70 In fact, the Court has de-
clared that “content-based regulations of speech are presumptively inva-
65. Scylla and Charybdis are figures from Greek mythology who presented a choice to
sailors. Avoiding Scylla, a six-headed sea monster, would require passing near Cha-
rybdis, another sea monster often embodied in the form of a whirlpool which would
devour ships. The choice that Odysseus faced in Homer’s Odyssey came to symbolize
a difficult choice of two options, either of which would result in some injury. See
Between Scylla and Charybdis, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Between_
Scylla_and_Charybdis (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
66. See Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U.S. 460, 469 (2009)).
67. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 961; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994).
68. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)
69. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
70. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95; see also Turner, 512 U.S. at 622; R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 960.
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lid.”71 Here, because the Act compels content-based speech, it is subject to
strict scrutiny.72 In order to satisfy the strict scrutiny requirement, a con-
tent-based “restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernment interest.”73
The Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to government regulations
that compel individuals to convey specific content on behalf of the State.74
In Wooley, the Court also addressed whether a statute that made it a misde-
meanor to cover figures or letters on an automobile’s license,75 thereby man-
dating the display of the state motto on passenger automobiles, was
narrowly tailored to achieve New Hampshire’s stated goals of “(1)
facilitat[ing] the identification of passenger vehicles, and (2) promot[ing]
appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride.”76 In support of its
holding, the Court stated the following:
Even were we to credit the State’s reasons and ‘even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamen-
tal personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose.’77
The Court held that the statute in question was not narrowly tailored
to achieve the State’s goals.78 The State could have required that all passen-
ger vehicle license plates contain a specific combination of letters and num-
bers, rather than the state motto, in order to identify that a car was
displaying the proper passenger plates as opposed to, for example, a com-
mercial license plate.79 In fact, the Court noted that there were “any number
of ways” that the State could have achieved its second avowed interest with-
out affecting a citizen’s First Amendment rights.80 Where New Hampshire’s
stated purposes could have been achieved in a fashion that did not “stifle
71. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188 (2007) (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S.
at 382).
72. See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
73. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
74. See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
75. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
76. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716.
77. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
78. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716.
79. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 n.13.
80. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
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fundamental personal liberties,”81 the statute requiring passenger vehicles to
display the state motto failed strict scrutiny. The Court, therefore, declared
the law unconstitutional.82
In the arena of content-based speech restrictions, the Supreme Court
has applied the least restrictive means test in order to determine whether a
statute is narrowly tailored to its stated purpose.83 In Ashcroft v. ACLU, the
Supreme Court reviewed a First Amendment challenge to the Child On-line
Protection Act (“COPA”), which made it a criminal offense to disseminate
content over the internet that would be “harmful to minors,” a phrase that
the Act broadly defined to include pornographic materials.84 COPA also
provided that an individual “may escape conviction . . . by demonstrating
that he ‘has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful’” by
employing one of a variety of age verification techniques.85 Because of
COPA’s focus on sexual speech in particular, the Court determined that the
statute was a content-based restriction and employed strict scrutiny.86 The
Court held that requiring webmasters to utilize age verification techniques
inappropriately infringed upon their free speech rights, especially when
these techniques were not the least restrictive means by which to address the
problem of minors viewing internet pornography.87 Among these lesser re-
strictive means was filtering software that parents could install on home
computers to prevent display of lewd content.88 Because COPA did not
utilize the least restrictive means and, thus, was not narrowly tailored to
achieve the government’s stated goal, the Court upheld a preliminary in-
junction barring its enforcement.89
81. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716.
82. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
83. See e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004).
84. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660, 661–62 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 231(a)(1), 231(e)(6)
(Westlaw through 2013 P.L. 113-31)).
85. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 662 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1) (Westlaw)).
86. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 670 (“The closest precedent on the general point is our decision
in Playboy Entertainment Group. Playboy Entertainment Group, like this case, involved
a content-based restriction designed to protect minors from viewing harmful materi-
als.”) (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000)); see
also Ashcroft 542 U.S. at 767 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Both the Court and Justice
Breyer err, however, in subjecting COPA to strict scrutiny.”).
87. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 668–69.
88. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 668–69.
89. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 673; see also Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 803 (holding that
a statute which prohibited signal bleed only of sexual images, which occurred when
non-subscribers to specific cable television channels were nonetheless able to view
such images from those channels, was a content-based restriction subject to strict
scrutiny).
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The Woman’s Right to Know Act is a content-based speech regulation
and is, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.90 The Act is content-based be-
cause it mandates that a physician verbally describe specific fetal anatomical
findings from ultrasounds performed on patients who are seeking abortions;
in doing so, the Act requires that the physician engage in speech in which
he would otherwise not engage, thereby necessarily altering the content of
his speech.91 Indeed, in Stuart, the State did not dispute evidence tending to
show that plaintiffs would not otherwise communicate the information that
the real-time speech and display provision requires unless a patient re-
quested that they do so.92
Pursuant to Wooley and Ashcroft, the Act, in order to be narrowly tai-
lored, must utilize the least restrictive means to achieve its stated goals.93
The State has proffered its interest in “promoting life and discouraging
abortion” in order to “justify[ ] the compelled speech.”94 Assuming that this
is a substantial interest,95 requiring that a physician verbally convey the
State’s message is not the least restrictive means by which North Carolina
might have otherwise achieved its goal. In Wooley, the configuration of let-
ters and numbers allowed police to recognize inappropriately displayed li-
cense plates without burdening individuals to speak on behalf of the State.96
Similarly, in Ashcroft, the use of filtering software by concerned parents on
their home computers represented a means by which a webmaster’s speech
would not be burdened.97
With respect to the Woman’s Right to Know Act, there are alternative
means by which to accomplish the State’s goal without impermissibly re-
straining a physician’s fundamental personal liberties.98 The most appropri-
90. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1070 (D.S.D. 2011) (holding that a South Dakota statute requiring physicians to
describe defined risks of the abortion procedure is subject to strict scrutiny).
91. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
92. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 n.5 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
93. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 673; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
94. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
95. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (concluding
that the State has “a substantial interest in potential life”). Casey does not refer to the
state’s interest in protecting life as compelling. However, the word choice here does
not change the outcome. Even if the interest were compelling, the Act would still fail
for the reasons discussed. If the Act fails to achieve its goal assuming that the state’s
interest is compelling, it would still most certainly fail if the state’s interest were
described by some term of lesser degree.
96. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.
97. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 668–69.
98. Judge Eagles commented that “[t]hese alternatives might include making the infor-
mation at issue available to the patient in written form, or possibly offering to pro-
vide the verbal or visual information to the patient but respecting the patient’s
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ate of these alternative means would be to inform patients that information
generally related to their choice to undergo an abortion is available from the
State for their purview.99 Instead of the diagrams of the fetus that Penn-
sylvania made available in Casey,100 North Carolina might depict and pub-
lish ultrasound images demonstrating fetal characteristics at two-week
gestational intervals.101 This has three pillars of support. First, this alterna-
tive would be consistent with prior Supreme Court jurisprudence; the plu-
rality in Casey held that a “State may . . . require doctors to inform a woman
seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the conse-
quences to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation
to her health.”102 Second, this would bypass the burden on physicians who
would otherwise be compelled to speak as emissaries of the State, conveying
a message that is not their own.
Third, by enabling a woman to choose whether she deems this infor-
mation relevant to her decision, it would empower her to exercise her own
autonomy. This option would cede power back to the patient and her phy-
sician to control the deliberative and dynamic process by which a patient
gives informed consent within the confines of the doctor-patient relation-
ship.103 The State may disagree with a woman’s ultimate decision to un-
dergo an abortion. The woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy,
rejection of hearing or seeing the information.” Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432–33
(citations omitted); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982) (holding that
in order to demonstrate narrow tailoring, the state must demonstrate that the statute
does not “unnecessarily circumscrib[e] protected expression”).
99. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (stating
that publication of information by the State “would communicate the desired infor-
mation to the public without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech . . . .”).
100. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 907.
101. To a degree, the North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act does provide women
with the option to review these materials by requiring that the State create a website
that contains “[m]aterials designed to inform the woman of the probable anatomical
and physiological characteristics of the unborn child . . . .” N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 90-21.83 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). By creating this website, the State
has enabled a woman seeking an abortion to review, at her leisure and in private,
information related to the pregnancy at any given gestational age. She herself is able
to determine its relevance to her personal decision. Further, this requirement does
not in the least adversely affect the First Amendment rights of physicians.
102. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
103. COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMIT-
TEE OPINION NO. 439, INFORMED CONSENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.
acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on%20Ethics/co439.
pdf?dmc=1&ts=20131025T1701394930 (“Informed consent should be looked on
as a process rather than a signature on a form. This process includes a mutual sharing
of information over time between the clinician and the patient to facilitate the pa-
tient’s autonomy in the process of making ongoing choices.”).
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however, is subject to the Supreme Court’s recognition of “the right of the
individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.”104 For whatever reason, North Carolina determined that
the public dissemination of this information alone would not achieve its
goal of “promoting life and discouraging abortion.”105
The Act compels a physician to communicate information that he
would otherwise not convey. This violates the First Amendment pursuant
to the Supreme Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence. Further, even if,
arguendo, a court were to disregard these cases, the Act, a content-based
speech regulation, would still be subject to strict scrutiny. Providing patients
with generic ultrasound pictures of fetuses at various gestational ages
presents an alternative that is substantially similar to one that the Supreme
Court has previously upheld as constitutional106 and that does not involve a
physician speaker. Given the availability of this less burdensome option, the
Act’s speech and display requirement is not narrowly tailored to achieve its
primary goal and fails under strict scrutiny analysis.
C. The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act Does Not Involve
Commercial Speech
As an attempt to avoid strict scrutiny, proponents of the North Caro-
lina Act have advanced the theory that the compelled speech that the Act
requires of physicians is commercial speech.107 Overall, the Supreme Court
has stated that commercial speech is “expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience.”108 The Court came closest
to specifically defining commercial speech in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corporation:109 “under th[e] approach [in Bolger], commercial speech has
three characteristics: (1) It is an advertisement of some form, (2) it refers to
a specific product, and (3) the speaker has an economic motivation for the
104. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
105. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011). Further, Judge Eagles
offered an additional solution, namely “offering to provide the verbal or visual infor-
mation to the patient but respecting the patient’s rejection of hearing or seeing the
information.” Id. at 432–33. She further noted that “the state has provided no evi-
dence that alternatives more in proportion to the resulting burdens placed on speech
would not suffice.” Id. at 432.
106. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884; Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 800 (1988).
107. See Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
108. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
109. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
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speech.”110 As applied to these facts, the Act’s speech and display require-
ment does not involve advertising.111 Additionally, given the State’s admis-
sion that one purpose of this Act is to reduce the number of abortions
performed, it can hardly be stated that a physician would have an economic
incentive for conveying this information.112 However, even if courts were to
recognize some degree of commercial speech in the speech and display re-
quirement, “where, as here, the component parts of a single speech are inex-
tricably intertwined, we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to
one phrase and another test to another phrase . . . . Therefore, [the Supreme
Court] appl[ies its] test for fully protected expression.”113
The likely reason that proponents of the Act argue that the speech and
display requirement is commercial speech is because the judicial adoption of
this approach would allow for a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny pursuant to
the four-pronged test described in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corpora-
tion v. Public Services Commission.114 According to Central Hudson, the gov-
ernment may regulate commercial speech in the following circumstances:
(1) if the speech at issue concerns lawful activity, (2) when there is a sub-
stantial state interest in regulating the speech, (3) when the regulation di-
110. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1125 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67).
111. The Supreme Court has addressed abortion-related advertisements in Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). There, a Virginia newspaper published information re-
garding the availability of abortion services in New York, violating a Virginia law
prohibiting advertising which encouraged obtaining an abortion. Id. at 812–13. Be-
cause the announcement “did more than simply propose a commercial transaction”
as it “contained factual material of clear ‘public interest,’ ” the Court held that the
Virginia statute was an improper limitation on First Amendment rights. Id. at 822,
829. It would seem to reason, therefore, that the privileged communications between
a physician and his patient would be regarded as something more than just commer-
cial speech.
112. Arguably, the Act provides an economic disincentive for abortion providers to pro-
vide such information to patients. If the proponents of the Act consider it to be a
means by which to discourage abortion, an abortion provider, in abiding by the Act’s
requirements, would theoretically be acting against his own economic interests. But,
even if a court were to hold that such a disincentive were commercial, the Supreme
Court has not clearly defined the boundary between what is commercial speech ver-
sus professional speech. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 795 (1988) (“It is not clear that a professional’s speech is necessarily commer-
cial whenever it relates to that person’s financial motivation for speaking.”); see also
Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1991) (discussing the relation-
ship between the medical profession and the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence).
113. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
114. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
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rectly advances the asserted state interest, and (4) when the regulation is not
more extensive than is necessary to accomplish the state’s goal.115
Applying commercial speech principles to the Act is inappropriate for
two primary reasons. First, as stated previously, the conversation between a
physician and his patient does not qualify as commercial speech according
to Bolger.116 Second, assuming, arguendo, that the Act both qualifies as com-
mercial speech and satisfies the first two prongs of Central Hudson, the Act
fails to satisfy the third and fourth prongs. Specifically, the speech and dis-
play requirement both fails to advance the State’s interest, at least in some
cases, and is more extensive than is necessary to achieve the State’s goal. As
to the third prong, the patient may, according to the statute itself, avert her
eyes from the images on the ultrasound screen and not listen to the descrip-
tion that the physician provides to her.117 When the patient avails herself of
the opportunity to look away from the screen providing information that
the State has deemed necessary to her informed consent and refuses to hear
the physician’s compelled message, the Act fails to ensure the patient’s “in-
formed consent.”118 Thus, the Act fails to advance the State’s interest as to
that individual. In Stuart, Judge Eagles commented on this contradiction:
[a]t oral argument, the Defendants suggested that this is in fact
what the Act allows because women can turn their heads or use
some sort of technological device if they do not wish to see or
hear the compelled message. It is not clear that this is so as to the
“compelled listening.” The statute requires the woman to certify
in writing that the speech-and-display requirements have been
met. It is hard to understand how she could do this if she “re-
fuse[s] to hear.” Assuming this is possible, it results in compel-
ling an unwilling speaker to deliver visual and spoken messages
to a listener who is not listening or looking. The Defendants
have not shown how this requirement is reasonably tailored to
meet the state’s interests.119
115. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
116. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67.
117. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(b) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)
(“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from
averting her eyes from the displayed images or from refusing to hear the simultane-
ous explanation and medical description.”).
118. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 405 (“An act to require a
twenty-four-hour waiting period and the informed consent of a pregnant woman
before an abortion may be performed.”).
119. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 433 n.9 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (citation omitted).
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With respect to the fourth prong, the State may make available ultrasound
images depicting the fetus at various stages of gestational development, as
discussed previously. Given this reasonable alternative that bypasses requir-
ing a physician to speak on the State’s behalf, the Act the Act does not use
the least restrictive means possible to achieve its goal.
Because the speech and display requirement does not involve commer-
cial speech, a heightened level of scrutiny is required. Even if a court were to
deem this to be commercial speech, requiring an unwilling physician to
convey a message to a non-listening patient cannot achieve the Act’s goal
when there are other less restrictive means of ensuring informed consent.
The speech and display requirement, therefore, fails to satisfy the third and
fourth prongs of Central Hudson. Under a commercial speech approach, this
failure would also render this portion of the Act unconstitutional. For the
two reasons previously discussed, the application of commercial speech
principles to the Act is inappropriate. Given that commercial speech juris-
prudence does not control, the Act’s speech and display requirement is sub-
ject to the standard “test[s] for fully protected expression.”120
What appears, however, to be a straightforward application of basic
First Amendment principles oversimplifies the issues raised by these types of
statutes. Indeed, the North Carolina Act is at the crossroads of the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment, informed consent, and abortion-related jurispru-
dence. This Article, until now, has focused on First Amendment issues in a
vacuum. The First Amendment issues, however, are inextricably linked to
the Supreme Court’s decisions dealing with informed consent and a
woman’s liberty interests in obtaining an abortion. To decide the constitu-
tionality of the Act based solely on the First Amendment would be im-
proper. The ultimate determination of the Act’s constitutionality requires
careful review of the relationship between the Act and current Supreme
Court jurisprudence in the area of reproductive autonomy.
III. THE WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW ACT: AT THE CROSSROADS OF
FIRST AMENDMENT, INFORMED CONSENT, AND
ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
Courts will not determine the constitutionality of the Act based solely
on the First Amendment. Since Roe v. Wade, abortion-related jurisprudence
has matured from questioning whether women have an individual liberty-
based right to obtain an abortion, to whether the State may reasonably regu-
late abortions to the extent that women seeking them are not unduly bur-
dened. A state requirement for physicians to speak on the State’s behalf, and
120. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
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in the name of protecting patients from making decisions with which the
State disagrees, is another step on this continuum. In this highly litigated
area, we must appreciate where abortion-related jurisprudence has been,
where it is now, and where the compelled speech issues presented in the
Woman’s Right to Know Act will take it in the future.
A. Where We Have Been: A Brief History of Abortion-Related Jurisprudence
In Casey, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter stated that
“[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”121 Supreme Court
decisions since Roe, however, have done little to dispel the doubt which, to
this day, pervades the Court’s reproductive autonomy jurisprudence.
Early reproductive autonomy cases relied on two separate constitu-
tional foundations. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a statute that prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives.122
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated that “specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations of those guaran-
tees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones
of privacy.”123 In Roe v. Wade, the Court expanded this notion of a right to
privacy, albeit in reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than the aforementioned penumbras, and determined
that there existed, prior to fetal viability, a right to terminate a pregnancy.124
The Court, therefore, determined that a state may restrict access to abortion
only where there is a compelling state interest.125 In response, both state and
local jurisdictions began to pass abortion-related statutes containing in-
formed consent provisions. In 1976, in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth, the Court upheld a Missouri law requiring that a patient
document her consent to an abortion while averring “that her consent is
informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion.”126
For a period thereafter, however, the Court was hostile to any addi-
tional abortion-related statute purportedly aimed at ensuring informed con-
sent. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, the Court
struck down an informed consent provision that was “designed not to in-
form the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it alto-
gether.”127 Similar to the North Carolina Act, the city ordinance at issue in
121. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
122. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
123. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citations omitted).
124. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
125. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
126. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65–66 (1976).
127. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).
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City of Akron required the physician to provide a detailed description of “the
anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn
child.”128 The Court was clear “that the State’s interest in ensuring that
consent to abortion is informed, does not permit the State to impose regula-
tions ‘designed to influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion
and [sic] childbirth.’”129 The Court further stated that the responsibility to
obtain informed consent “remains primarily the responsibility of the
physician.”130
The Supreme Court in subsequent opinions reinforced the City of Ak-
ron decision.131 In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act, which
required that physicians convey five of seven specific types of information to
patients seeking abortions.132 Of note, North Carolina’s Act currently re-
quires that all of these types of information are conveyed to patients seeking
abortions.133 The Court stated that the Act was “nothing less than an out-
right attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion
into the privacy of the informed consent dialogue between the woman and
her physician.”134 Further, the Court stated that “[a]ll this is, or comes close
to being, state medicine imposed upon the woman, not the professional
medical guidance she seeks, and it officially structures—as it obviously was
intended to do—the dialogue between the woman and her physician.”135
Recognizing that “a rape victim should not have to hear gratuitous advice
that an unidentified perpetrator is liable for support if she continues the
pregnancy to term” and that “the ‘information’ in its very rendition may be
cruel as well as destructive of the physician-patient relationship,” the Court
concluded that “[t]his type of compelled information is the antithesis of
informed consent.”136 In Thornburgh and City of Akron, the Court ad-
dressed substantially similar questions as those that the Act currently poses.
If these cases were still controlling precedent, courts would have clear gui-
dance when reviewing the Act.
128. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
129. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Mak-
ing, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 245 (2009) (quoting City of Akron, 462
U.S. at 443–44).
130. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 443.
131. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986).
132. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760–61.
133. Compare Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760–61, with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-
21.82(1) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
134. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762.
135. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
136. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763–64.
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In 1992, however, the Supreme Court in Casey partially overruled and
severely curtailed the holdings of Thornburgh and City of Akron with respect
to statutes requiring physicians to provide specific information to pa-
tients.137 Specifically,
To the extent that Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional
violation where the government requires . . . the giving of truth-
ful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the abortion
procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth,
and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases . . . are
inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgement of an important inter-
est in potential life, and are overruled.138
Further, Casey overruled outright the previous cases’ holdings that twenty-
four hour waiting periods were unreasonable, finding that such intervals
were not an undue burden to a woman’s access to abortion services.139 Casey
also rejected Roe’s trimester approach.140 The Roe approach prohibited any
regulation affecting the availability of abortion in the first trimester, allowed
for reasonable regulation aimed at “promoting . . . the health of the mother”
provided that the regulation did not ban the procedure in the second, and
permitted outright bans of abortion in the third trimester after viability.141
The Casey Court focused on viability rather than this trimester scheme.142
Before viability, while the government could not prohibit abortion, the
State could regulate abortion provided that such statutes did not place an
undue burden upon the availability of, and a patient’s access to, the proce-
dure.143 Specifically, the Court noted the following:
To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life,
throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure
that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to
advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their pur-
pose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abor-
tion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the
right.144
137. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
138. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
139. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–86.
140. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
141. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
142. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–77.
143. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–77.
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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The Supreme Court in Casey partially upheld the Pennsylvania statute
in question,145 holding that a state could require a physician to inform pa-
tients seeking abortions of the gestational age of the fetus and the availabil-
ity of specific printed materials potentially related to the informed consent
of patients.146 These materials, published by the State, included anatomical
and developmental descriptions of the unborn fetus, a list of agencies offer-
ing abortion alternatives, information regarding the availability of insurance
benefits that may be available to defray the cost of pregnancy, and the fact
that the father of the unborn child may be liable for child support.147 The
statute permitted the last requirement to be omitted in cases of rape.148 Yet
the Court did not address whether the holdings of Thornburgh and City of
Akron were still in effect with respect to the unconstitutionality of provi-
sions that required physicians themselves to provide a detailed description of
the “the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular un-
born child.”149 Recognizing, however, that the statute implicated a physi-
cian’s First Amendment rights, the Court stated:
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information
about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner man-
dated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment
rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977), but only as part of the practice of medicine,
subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977). We see no constitu-
tional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide
the information mandated by the State here.150
145. Casey partially upheld and partially invalidated the Pennsylvania statute in question.
The portions of the statute that the Court invalidated were a spousal notification
requirement and a reporting requirement for failure to notify one’s spouse. See Casey,
505 U.S. at 898.
146. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901–02.
147. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901–03.
148. Casey, 505 U.S. at 903.
149. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444–45
(1983).
150. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. The final word of this quote, “here,” is significant. Assuming
that this refers to the Pennsylvania statute in question, the Court appears to address
the specific requirements of the law as not violating the First Amendment. The
Court did not, however, delineate what, if any, additional requirement might violate
a physician’s First Amendment right. Indeed, the only direct speech involved in this
Act is the conveyance of the gestational age of the fetus to the patient and nothing
more than the availability of a variety of other information and materials available
from the State. Id. at 902. The statute in Casey involves significantly less physician
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The plurality further opined that “a requirement that a doctor give a
woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion
is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor
give certain specific information about any medical procedure.”151
Since Casey, the Court’s internal struggle with respect to abortion
rights has continued. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
invalidated Nebraska’s ban of the dilation and extraction procedure, the so
called “partial-birth abortion,” on the basis of expert medical testimony
that, in certain cases, this procedure was preferred over the more common
dilation and evacuation procedure.152 Seven years after Stenberg, when the
Court’s composition had changed, the Supreme Court upheld a very similar
legislation enacted federally, entitled the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act.153
Given that the “jurisprudence of doubt”154 continues to this day, stat-
utes seeking to limit abortion continue to “chip away at the private choice
shielded in Roe v. Wade.”155 Informed consent laws exemplify this un-
resolved jurisprudence. This point is made by Professor Erwin Chemerin-
sky, a renowned scholar in constitutional and First Amendment law and
Dean of the University of California, Irvine School of Law:
The issue that Casey leaves unresolved is how far the government
can go in this direction in the form of informed consent laws.
For example, do Akron and Thornburgh remain good law that
the government could not require that women be given detailed
descriptions of the fetus, or shown photographs, or told that
human life begins at conception? There is a strong argument
that all of these go much further than the Pennsylvania law in
Casey and thus that the Court might find them to be an undue
burden on access to abortion.156
B. Where We Are Now: The Federal Circuits
Both the Eighth and Fifth Circuits have recently addressed the consti-
tutionality of several abortion-related informed consent statutes. In Planned
Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, a case in-
speech than the North Carolina Act. Compare id., with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 90-21.81–21.92 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
151. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
152. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 940, 945 (2000).
153. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
154. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
155. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 952 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
156. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 854.
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volving a series of appeals and remands, the Eighth Circuit upheld a South
Dakota statute requiring that physicians inform patients “that the abortion
will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being”
that a patient “has an existing relationship with that unborn human being
and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States Consti-
tution and under the laws of South Dakota,” and “that by having an abor-
tion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights with
regards to that relationship will be terminated.”157 The Eighth Circuit justi-
fied this holding by asserting that the State can demand that physicians
provide patients with certain kinds of information:
while the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the
State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to
require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading informa-
tion relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if
that information might also encourage the patient to choose
childbirth over abortion.158
This set of decisions, in addition to being rather perverse in upholding
provisions requiring physicians to provide information to their patients re-
garding the constitutional rights of fetuses, involves issues substantially simi-
lar to those addressed by the Fifth Circuit.
157. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 665–66 (8th
Cir. 2011) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)–(d) (Westlaw
through 2013 Reg. Sess.)). This case resulted in a complex set of district and circuit
court opinions that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals best summarized in a footnote
in Lakey:
See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D.S.D.
2005) (granting preliminary injunction) (vacated); Planned Parenthood
Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(vacating grant of preliminary injunction and remanding); Planned
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D.
2009) (granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and partial
summary judgment in favor of defendants) (affirmed in part, reversed in
part); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011)
(reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on all but one
claim and remanding) (vacated in part); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D.,
S.D. v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011) (vacating panel’s affirm-
ance of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and granting rehear-
ing en banc on that issue).
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574 n.1
(5th Cir. 2012).
158. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35 (en banc).
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Similar to the statute in question in Rounds, the Fifth Circuit recently
concluded that the Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act was a constitutional
exercise of the State’s power to regulate the practice of medicine.159 In Texas
Medical Providers Providing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the Appellate Court
vacated a preliminary injunction of the Texas Act, which, except for the fact
that Texas included limited exemptions in cases of rape, incest, and other
medical conditions, is substantially similar to the North Carolina Act.160
The Fifth Circuit’s decision was based on two interrelated foundations: first,
the Court determined that strict scrutiny does not apply to compelled
speech by physicians in the arena of abortion; second, the Court determined
that any law that requires truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures
is a reasonable regulation of medical practice.161 The Court further stated
that “[a]ppellees must confront the Supreme Court’s holding in [Casey] that
reaffirmed a woman’s substantive due process right to terminate a preg-
nancy but also upheld an informed consent statute over precisely the same
‘compelled speech’ challenges made here.”162
The speech in Casey, however, is not at all similar to the speech in
either the South Dakota, Texas, or North Carolina statutes. Overall, both
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits based their opinions on two reasonable as-
sumptions: first, that Casey allows a physician to communicate the availabil-
ity of information that the State deems relevant to a patient’s decision to
obtain an abortion, and second, that the State may reasonably regulate the
practice of medicine.163 From these assumptions, these circuit courts con-
cluded that it is constitutionally permissible for the State to compel the
physician to verbally describe specific fetal anatomic findings and convey
specific, non-medical information in order to ensure informed consent. The
Supreme Court, however, should not accept the conclusions of these circuit
courts without addressing at least one substantive question: where is the
boundary between appropriate dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading
information and the unconstitutional infringement of a physician’s First
Amendment rights?
159. Lakey, 667 F.3d. at 576.
160. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122(d) (West 2011).
161. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576, 578.
162. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 574.
163. See generally Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575, 578; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35.
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C. Where We Are Going: The Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Vindicate a
Physician’s Right to Free Speech
Overall, “what a [S]tate can say itself is very different from what the
[S]tate can compel individuals to say.”164 Further, because the North Caro-
lina Woman’s Right to Know Act, by its own language, fails, in certain
circumstances, to ensure that the patient’s consent will indeed be informed,
Casey does not control. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence is dispositive in determining the constitutionality of the Act’s
speech and display requirement.
The Act’s speech and display requirement not only burdens physician
speakers, but also fails to achieve its primary goal to ensure informed con-
sent. Section 91-21.85(b) of the Act states, “[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the
displayed images or from refusing to hear the simultaneous explanation and
medical description.”165 As previously described, this tacit permission to not
hear the information that the physician provides is fundamentally at odds
with the process of informed consent, which requires two engaged par-
ties.166 Indeed, while attempting to ensure informed consent, this statute
“results in compelling an unwilling speaker to deliver visual and spoken
messages to a listener who is not listening or looking.”167 In this situation,
with the patient neither looking at ultrasound images nor listening to the
description of the fetus, both of which the State has deemed necessary to
achieving informed consent for abortions, it is impossible for the State to
ensure that such consent is indeed informed for those patients who decline
164. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430 n.6 (M.D.N.C. 2011). Further, “when the
government speaks for itself, it ‘may make content-based choices’ but that ‘in the
realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one
speaker over another.’” Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828, 833 (1995)).
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(b) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
166. See Manian, supra note 129.
To the physician, whose training enables a self-satisfying evaluation, the
answer may seem clear, but it is the prerogative of the patient, not the
physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem
to lie.’ The court reasoned that informed consent liability should rest on a
patient-based standard of disclosure, because ‘[r]espect for the patient’s
right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by
law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose
upon themselves.’
Id. at 238 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781, 784 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
167. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 433 n.9.
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to look and listen.168 As such, the Act is not an abortion-related informed
consent law that Casey and its progeny would otherwise control. Rather, it is
an unreasonable, content-based restraint on a physician’s First Amendment
right to free speech, one of our “most precious freedoms.”169 As a result,
courts should apply strict scrutiny to the speech and display provisions of
the Act in order to prevent government overreach.170
Also troubling is the fact that a physician who abides by the Act’s
extensive requirements will still be out of compliance with the general in-
formed consent provision of the North Carolina General Statutes.171 The
Act provides that “consent to an abortion is voluntary and informed only if
all of the following conditions are satisfied . . . .”172 Thus, the Act statutorily
redefines informed consent specifically for abortion; if the physician satisfies
all of the Act’s conditions, the resulting consent is deemed, by statute, to be
informed. It would appear, therefore, that the State has obviated the re-
quirement of physicians to comply with the general informed consent stat-
utes when it comes to obtaining informed consent for abortion. While the
physician is compelled to inform the patient of a host of information, the
Act does not require that the patient have a “general understanding of the
procedure[ ] or treatment[,]” a hallmark of general informed consent as de-
fined in Section 90-21.13 of the North Carolina General Statutes.173 Tech-
nically, a physician could obtain from his patient appropriate informed
consent as defined by the Woman’s Right to Know Act while actually failing
to impart a general understanding of the procedure to the patient. In so
doing, while the physician would satisfy the informed consent provisions of
the Act, the obtained consent would not be truly informed. It would appear
that this would not represent a violation of the law as written because the
physician would have complied with the Act and, as such, would have ob-
tained legal, albeit inadequate, informed consent as the Act now defines it
specifically for abortion.
168. This argument might encourage a supporter of the Act to amend its language and
write out the exception. This exception and the Act as currently written may very
well be a violation of the First Amendment rights of physicians; however, if the
exception were written out of the Act, then there would be significant questions
involving not only physician First Amendment rights, but also of whether the State’s
blanket requirement that women look at and listen to the State’s ideological message
represents an undue burden under Casey.
169. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
170. See generally United States v. Carolene Products, Inc., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938);
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 798–805 (2006).
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.13 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
172. Id. at § 90-21.82.
173. See Id. at § 90-21.13.
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Even if, however, an appellate court were to disregard these fundamen-
tal flaws, North Carolina’s Act begs the question of whether there exists an
outer boundary of permissible informed consent laws. Generally, “informed
consent requirements exist to protect the rights of patients and to honor
their autonomy, not to provide states with an excuse to impose heavy-
handed, paternalistic, and impractical restrictions on the practice of
medicine.”174 The notion of informed consent first gained widespread rec-
ognition in Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital, when then New
York State Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote, “[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent commits assault . . . .”175 Decades later, the D.C. Circuit Court, in
a seminal case, stated that the informed consent doctrine relies on “the pa-
tient’s understanding of alternatives to and risks of the therapy”176 Indeed,
“found ‘in the fiducial qualities of [the physician-patient] relationship [is]
the physician’s duty to reveal to the patient that which in his best interests it
is important that he should know.’”177 Further, “a patient cannot make an
informed, intelligent decision to consent to a physician’s suggested treat-
ment unless the physician discloses what is material to the patient’s deci-
sion, i.e., all of the viable alternatives and risks of the treatment
proposed.”178 Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that the
following is required to meet the statutory standard of informed consent:
[T]he health care provider must provide the patient with suffi-
cient information about the proposed treatment and its attend-
ant risks to conform to the customary practice of members of
the same profession with similar training and experience situated
in the same or similar communities. In addition, the health care
provider must impart enough information to permit a reasonable
person to gain a ‘general understanding’ of both the treatment or
procedure and the ‘usual and most frequent risks and hazards’
associated with the treatment.179
174. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS,
2012 WL 373132, at *2 n.5 (W.D. Tex. Feb 6, 2012).
175. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
176. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
177. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782 (quoting Emmett v. E. Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396
F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
178. Adler ex rel Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Wisc. 1996) (citing Mar-
tin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wisc. 1995)).
179. Foard v. Jarman, 387 S.E.2d 162, 164 (N.C. 1990); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 90-21.13 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (containing the provision entitled
“[i]nformed consent to health care treatment or procedure”).
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Compared to statutory and common law standards for informed con-
sent, the Act is not consistent with current notions of this doctrine. The
performance of an ultrasound, coupled with a physician’s description of the
ultrasonographic findings, goes far beyond the elements required for in-
formed consent as the State previously defined it. The ability of ultrasound
to graphically demonstrate the presence of a fetal liver or a lower extremity
does not aid in a general understanding of the abortion procedure itself.
Further, if courts follow the Fifth Circuit and deem this to be relevant infor-
mation in making an informed decision, where is the logical end? When
abortions still occur despite the Act, will North Carolina deem it necessary
for a physician to read all one thousand six hundred and sixty-eight pages of
Williams Obstetrics, a premier text in the field,180 to a patient twenty-four
hours prior to an abortion? After all, doing so would provide truthful, non-
misleading information to patients. Additionally, because the patient is
pregnant, the information included in the text would represent the epitome
of relevance. Such a requirement would be absurd. Yet, aside from the vol-
ume of information required, such a regulation is no different from the
current law: they both require transmittal of information which, while
truthful and nonmisleading, does not guide a patient and her physician in
their unified goal of obtaining informed consent. It is only helpful to the
State so that it may achieve its goal of “promoting life and discouraging
abortion.”181
According to Casey, informed consent requirements “must be calcu-
lated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”182 The North Caro-
lina Act and other similar statutes fundamentally disregard this notion.
Overall, at its most basic level, the freedom to give informed consent must
also coexist with the freedom to withhold it.183 But, the issue that the Act
creates is whether a woman’s decision to undergo an abortion can indeed be
A health care provider fails to obtain consent by not providing information
to the patient which would, under the same or similar circumstances, have
given a reasonable person a general understanding of the procedures and
treatments to be used, and the usual and most frequent risks and hazards
inherent in them as recognized by other health care providers in the same or
similar communities.
Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions, N.C. Conference of Superior Court Judges,
North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases § 809.45 (2012).
180. See F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS (21st ed. 2001).
181. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
182. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
183. See Manian, supra note 129, at 239 n.107 (“Anglo-American law starts with the
premise of thorough-going self determination. It follows that each man is considered
to be master of his own body and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit
the performance of lifesaving surgery, or other medical treatment.”) (quoting Natan-
son v. Klein, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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considered unhindered when the State itself is requiring that an ultrasound
be performed and that the physician disclose information that is only tan-
gentially related to the performance of the procedure itself.184 It is difficult
to imagine that a patient who enters a physician’s office seeking an abortion
does not realize that, should she undergo the procedure, she will be termi-
nating her pregnancy and will not carry her fetus to term. Given that pa-
tients, especially those seeking abortion services, are likely aware of what
abortion generally is, an ultrasound and the required physician disclosures
do not increase the likelihood of a patient’s informed consent. The
Woman’s Right to Know Act, passed in order to facilitate and ensure in-
formed consent, in actuality does nothing more than attempt to coerce a
patient into withholding that consent. This is the “antithesis of informed
consent.”185
Even if the speech and display requirement succeeds in conveying the
State’s interest in protecting life, the Act will fail to achieve its nominal
objective of ensuring un-coerced informed consent in two ways. First, the
patient may not even be listening to the information that the physician
conveys.186 Second, the patient is not able to exercise absolute autonomy in
her decision. Assuming that “the patient, not the physician, [may] deter-
184. Proof of the tangential nature of these disclosures lies in the fact that, in Stuart,
“[t]he evidence before the Court establishes without dispute or contradictions that
the plaintiffs would not communicate the message required by the speech-and-dis-
play requirement in the absence of the statute or patient request.” Stuart, 834 F.
Supp. 2d at 429 n.5. Further, “[t]he uncontradicted evidence establishes that there is
no purpose for requiring the speaking or showing of this material to an unwilling
listener.” Id. at 432 n.7. Lastly, “the undisputed evidence offered by the plaintiffs
establishes that these provisions are likely to harm the psychological health of the
very group the state purports to protect.” Id. at 432.
185. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764
(1986); see also Amanda M. Roe Not-so-Informed Consent: Using the Doctor-Patient
Relationship to Promote State-Supported Outcomes, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 205, 223
n.113 (2009).
Though [such] information may not be inaccurate, it is no less of an impo-
sition on the physician-patient relationship. In fact, there is interesting evi-
dence suggesting that even a truthful message can be misleading when it
inappropriately takes advantage of emotional influence in order to bias an
individual in favor of a particular decision.
Id. (citing Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications
of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH L. REV. 1, 1
(2008)); Manian, supra note 129; Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to
Double Blind: Informed Consent in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599
(2008). But see Kaitlin Moredock, “Ensuring So Grave a Choice Is Well Informed”:
The Use of Abortion Informed Consent Laws to Promote State Interest in Unborn
Life, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1973 (2010).
186. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(b) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
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mine for [her]self the direction in which [her] interests seem to lie,”187 it can
in no way be permissible for the State to supplant the physician to achieve
its own goals. As such, the Act actively contravenes the State’s attempt to
ensure that abortions are un-coerced.
The Supreme Court has ruled that, under its police power, a state may
reasonably regulate the practice of medicine.188 In Whalen v. Roe, the Court
upheld a New York statute that required physicians to write prescriptions
for medications of potential abuse in triplicate, identifying the physician,
dispensing pharmacy, drug name, dosage, and patient’s name, address, and
age.189 The physician was then required to send a carbon copy to the New
York Department of Health, which then recorded this data for potential use
in criminal investigations.190 The appellees in this case alleged that the “stat-
ute threaten[ed] to impair . . . their interest in making important decisions
independently.”191 The Court found neither record evidence supporting
this allegation nor anything “unreasonable in the assumption that the pa-
tient-identification requirement might aid in the enforcement of laws de-
signed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs.”192 Overall, the Court
held the statute was a constitutional, “reasonable exercise of New York’s
broad police powers.”193 As Judge Eagles notes with respect to the Woman’s
Right to Know Act, “[t]hat is not, however, this case.”194
A one-size-fits-all state-mandated script that physicians must convey
to patients seeking abortions is not a reasonable regulation of the practice of
medicine. In Casey, the Supreme Court recognized that, “[t]o be sure, the
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as
part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regula-
tion by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that
the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.”195
However,
[t]he [North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know] Act goes well
beyond requiring disclosure of those items traditionally a part of
the informed consent process, which include in this context the
nature and risks of the procedure and the gestational age of the
187. Manian, supra note 129, at 238 n.102 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d.
772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
188. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977).
189. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593.
190. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593, 595.
191. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
192. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597–98, 603.
193. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
194. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
195. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884.
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fetus. The Act also goes well beyond the provision approved in
Casey, which only required providers to “make available” state-
generated written materials which contained a viewpoint.196
The plurality in Casey further stated that “[a]n undue burden exists,
and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the
fetus attains viability.”197 Further, “[u]nnecessary health regulations that
have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right to have an abor-
tion.”198 The Fifth Circuit held that the Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act
is not an obstacle to obtaining an abortion.199 The Court noted that,
“[f]irst, informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the
woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful,
nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws are part of the
state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice.”200 But, these conclusions
disregard the prohibition in Casey that informed consent requirements can-
not be required of physicians if the required information might harm their
patients:
Our prior cases also suggest that the straightjacket of particular
information which must be given in each case interferes with a
constitutional right of privacy between a pregnant woman and
her physician. As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that
the statute now before us does not require a physician to comply
with the informed consent provisions if he or she can demon-
strate by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she reasona-
bly believed that furnishing the information would have resulted
in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of
the patient. In this respect the statute does not prevent the physi-
cian from exercising his or her medical judgment.201
Based on this, by compelling a physician to perform an ultrasound
and convey all of the additional related disclosures to all patients seeking an
abortion without exception, North Carolina impermissibly intrudes into the
196. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 431–32 (citations omitted).
197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
198. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
199. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th
Cir. 2012).
200. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576.
201. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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doctor-patient relationship. Indeed, “it is the physician, not the Legislature,
who is in the best position to make [relevant informed consent] determina-
tion[s] as to each individual patient. The [Texas Act’s] one-size-fits-all ap-
proach [is] wholly inconsistent with reasonable regulation of medical
practice.”202 This statement provides further support that the speech and
display requirement is an unreasonable regulation of the medical profession
as it represents an inappropriate encroachment on a physician’s ability to
tailor appropriate medical care to individual patients.203 While the Act may
not represent an undue burden on a woman’s access to abortion services,
202. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS,
2012 WL 373132, at *3 n.8 (W.D. Tex. Feb 6, 2012).
203. As a practicing, board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist, I find the effects of this law
astounding and agree with the plaintiff’s affiants in Stuart that the Act’s “provisions
are likely to harm the psychological health of the very group the state purports to
protect.” Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011). The Act
defines abortion as the following:
[t]he use or prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or other sub-
stance or device intentionally to terminate the pregnancy of a woman
known to be pregnant with an intention other than to do any of the follow-
ing: a. Increase the probability of a live birth. b. Preserve the life or health
of the child. c. Remove a dead, unborn child who died as the result of (i)
natural causes in utero, (ii) accidental trauma, or (iii) a criminal assault on
the pregnant woman or her unborn child which causes the premature ter-
mination of the pregnancy.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.81 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). First, there
are no exceptions for women seeking abortion in the setting of a pregnancy compli-
cated by any one of a host of lethal conditions that are incompatible with life (e.g.,
Tay-Sachs Disease or Trisomy 13). The notion of performing an ultrasound and
counseling a patient, who otherwise desired the pregnancy, regarding the formed
anatomic features of a twelve-week fetus with either of these conditions whose fate is
predetermined is astounding. Further, while I have not practiced in the realm of
family planning, many OB/GYNs will, in the normal course of their practice, en-
counter situations where standard medical practice may involve induction of labor of
a non-viable fetus, a procedure that this Act would include under its definition of
abortion. In cases of early mid-trimester preterm premature rupture of the mem-
branes, fetal survival is low and there exists a significant risk, if intervention is not
performed, of maternal infection and significant morbidity. Certainly, in this situa-
tion, an ultrasound may be indicated to evaluate and measure remaining pockets of
amniotic fluid. However, being required to describe in detail the “presence of exter-
nal members and internal organs” and offer “the opportunity to hear the fetal heart
tone” to a patient who desires the pregnancy but recognizes the risk to her own
health places an unnecessary burden and needless stress not only on the physician,
but also, and more importantly, on the patient. §§ 90-21.83, 90-21.85 (Westlaw).
As Justice Scalia noted, “it is safer to assume that the people are smart enough to get
the information they need than to assume that the government is wise or impartial
enough to make the judgment for them.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C.,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 804 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the Act directly contradicts other portions of the Casey opinion. Indeed,
given Casey’s reliance on the reasonable regulation of medical practice as
being a cornerstone of informed consent laws,204 any statute that is unrea-
sonable cannot find refuge under Casey’s umbrella.
The issue is, therefore, not whether the Act represents an undue bur-
den on abortion access, but rather whether the Act is a reasonable regulation
of the medical profession.205 It is not. The Act grants tacit permission to a
patient to not view the ultrasound images or hear the physician’s verbal
description thereof.206 When the patient does not look or listen, the com-
pelled speech no longer has any demonstrable purpose. Further, the Act
defines a new standard of informed consent for abortion which fails to in-
clude a requirement that a physician provide the patient with a general un-
derstanding of the procedure itself. This version of informed consent would
be inadequate for all other medical interventions according to North Caro-
lina law.207 A law that seeks to ensure informed consent but fails on at least
two accounts to do so is an unreasonable regulation of the medical profes-
sion. As such, Casey does not control because Casey only contemplates rea-
sonable regulations of medical practice.208 All that remains, therefore, is the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as the dispositive polar
star. The Act compels a physician to alter the content of his conversation
with his patient in order to convey the State’s ideological message. Given
that the speech and display requirement fails to achieve informed consent,
the Act is not narrowly tailored to accomplish its nominal goal. The State,
therefore, fails to meet its heavy burden under strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act represents a novel
mechanism by which the State seeks to convey, via a physician intermedi-
ary, its interest in protecting the lives of fetuses. At its core, the Act creates
tension between the State’s ability to reasonably regulate the practice of
medicine and the physician’s First Amendment protections. Despite the Su-
preme Court’s seeming invitation to state legislatures to regulate abortion-
204. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (“To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not
to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), but only as
part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977).”).
205. See supra note 203.
206. § 90-21.85(b) (Westlaw).
207. See Id. at § 90-21.13.
208. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884–85.
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related informed consent in Carhart v. Gonzales,209 this specific Act and its
brethren have placed the judicial system in the challenging position of deter-
mining the appropriate balance between protecting a physician’s constitu-
tional right to free speech—one of “our most precious freedoms[,]”210—and
attempting to ensure that physicians provide the State’s version of informed
consent to patients seeking abortion prior to the procedure.
From a pure First Amendment analysis, the Act is unconstitutional.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has developed within its jurisprudence a clear
disdain for government-compelled speech.211 Looking at the statute through
another First Amendment framework, the Act fails under strict scrutiny as it
is not narrowly tailored to achieve its purported goal of ensuring that pa-
tients give truly informed consent. Indeed, not only do less restrictive means
by which the State might accomplish this goal exist, but also the plain lan-
guage of the statute itself dooms the Act to failure, at least when patients
avail themselves of the right to not view and hear the State’s message. As a
result of the latter, the Act compels an individual to speak on its behalf in a
manner that is potentially futile with respect to the Act’s averred purpose.
The Act, therefore, is not a reasonable regulation of the medical profession
that seeks to ensure informed consent. Rather, the Act is an unreasonable
regulation that compels physician speech. As such, the undue burden analy-
sis of Casey falls away and all that remains is the First Amendment analysis.
This analysis reveals that the speech and display requirement of the North
Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act is an unconstitutional violation of a
physician’s rights under the First Amendment. 
209. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007); see also Manian, supra note 129,
at 289 (“Within abortion law, Carhart’s woman-protective rationale has already had
significant impact in the courts and in the public arena, as exhibited particularly by
legislatures enacting even more biased abortion ‘informed consent’ laws . . . .”).
210. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
211. See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 701 (1977); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).

